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The difference sameness makes
Racial recognition and the ‘narcissism of minor differences’
BRETT ST LOUIS
Goldsmiths College, University of London, UK
ABSTRACT This article examines the form and effects of differentiation that
surface within the artifice of racial sameness. Using contemporary debates between
‘native-born’ and ‘foreign-born’ blacks in the USA over the right to ‘African
American’ identity and the socioeconomic threat posed to the former by the latter,
I show how the operation of the logic of race internally within a racial group
reiterates familiar effects of racialization. Drawing on Freud’s notion of the ‘narcis-
sism of minor differences’ as a framing device, I point out that this difference/
sameness relation is not simply antagonistic through an analysis of the ambiguity of
Africa as posing a socioeconomic threat in the migrants it sends while also present-
ing the historical and symbolic basis for African American claims to cultural distinc-
tiveness. The article builds a critique of the invention of sameness that makes
difference in two key ways: first, through the representation of difference as an
antithesis that affirms the racialized self characterized by sameness; and second, that
this makes a political difference in the sense that this dialectic of black as self and
other reifies the social problematic of its sameness/difference relation as intrinsically
(intra)racial to the extent that the substantive socioeconomic causality of racial
stratification and racism are obscured.
KEY WORDS African American ● black ● ethnicity ● race ● racism
It is above all the practical significance of men for one another that is determined
by both similarities and differences among them. Similarity, as fact or tendency, is
no less important than difference. In the most varied forms, both are the great
principles of all external and internal development. In fact the cultural
development of mankind can be conceived as the history of the struggles and
conciliatory attempts between the two. (Georg Simmel, 1950[1917]: 30)
In the analytic of race, neither difference nor sameness can be sequestered,
since both manifest, convey and inhabit each other. (Chetan Bhatt, 2004: 31 )
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In August 2004, a New York Times cover article detailed a problem of racial
differentiation notable in its unusualness (Swarns, 2004). During a public
discussion on the need to develop projects to educate African Americans
on prostate cancer a suggestion that African immigrants ought to be
included was comprehensively rejected. Abdulaziz Kamus, the Ethiopian-
born activist who had raised the question, voiced an obvious objection: ‘But
I am African and I am an American citizen; am I not African-American?’
(Swarns, 2004: 1). After being informed that he could not claim such group
membership and that the public health education project could not be
expanded to meet his wishes, Kamus incredulously asked how he might
accurately define himself.
This paradox of African American identification emerges from the basic
fact that there are increasing numbers of black immigrants in the USA: for
example, as at 2000, foreign-born blacks constitute 30 percent of the black
population of New York City and 28 percent of that of Boston. In the
attempt to understand and situate the significance of this development, the
matter of who has the ‘right’ to African American identity has become a
principal question. As Alan Keyes, the African American Republican candi-
date for the Illinois seat in the 2004 Senate elections, argued in positioning
himself against his black Democratic opponent, Barack Obama – the son
of a Kenyan father and white mother from Kansas – the basis of this right
is asserted through the historical legacy of US slavery and the distinctive-
ness of slave ancestry instead of racial (read phenotypical) similarity.1 One
might surmise, therefore, that the location of Africa as a distant or not-
so-distant homeland is of crucial importance. Furthermore, the black
immigration trends and ensuing categorical opposition between black and
African American fuels fears that these ‘new-comers’ might eclipse
‘native-born blacks’ – to this end the article cites the perception that
black immigrants are aggressive competitors against native-born blacks
for social resources and opportunities. And finally, this zero-sum situation
is forcefully represented within the allied concern that ‘newly arrived’
black immigrants and their children will reap the benefits of hard-fought
Civil Rights struggles: Henry Louis Gates’s recognition that almost two-
thirds of black Harvard students are either African or Caribbean immi-
grants or the children of African or Caribbean immigrants and that they
ought to be emulated by African Americans instead of made ‘scapegoats’
serves as a potent case in point of the tension and anxiety surrounding
certain concerns with black social identification.2
This example is striking in the attention it draws to the existence of
divisive difference within a racial group usually assumed to be character-
ized by sameness. And although this dispute might be taken as predicated
on notions of shared history, cultural similarity, and social solidarity analo-
gous with ethnic as opposed to racial identification, we would do well to
remember the symbiotic relationship between race and ethnicity, perhaps
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especially pertinent to the USA.3 But moreover, this dispute raises the
question of the basis of such strong forms of racial recognition as well as
the justification for its strict policing. Indeed, given the replacement of
‘black’ with ‘African American’ in much formal and informal US social
discourse, the dialectic of attraction and repulsion in the symbolic appro-
priation of Africa begs explanation.4 Simply put, what is the ‘Africa’ that is
appropriated and rejected within black/African American racial identifi-
cation and, more importantly, why?
This problematic vividly demonstrates the intricate character of what is
now routinely referred to as the social construction of race and ethnicity.
Within this abstracted mantra, the constitutive process of racial meaning
making that emerges from the interface between external and internal
processes of ascribed racialization and voluntary racial formation is brought
into sharp relief. If the distinctiveness of racial sameness (such as native-
born African American) creates and depends upon relational differences
(such as with foreign-born black American) then the dialectic between
sameness and difference is deeply significant. Because these relational
categories are so close in many respects, especially the claim or myth of
origin5 central to the construction of African American, that their minor
differences serve to solidify putative sameness, this sameness is not what it
purports to be. This sameness is neither absolute – meaning exactly alike,
similar, or not different – nor the ‘changing same’ brought into being via the
routes of hybrid and syncretic ethnic cultures (Gilroy, 1993). Rather, it is a
contradiction in terms whose pretence to insularity demands the incessant
(re)production of, and interaction with, an intimately correlate other. In
addressing this paradox, this article develops Freud’s notion of the ‘narcis-
sism of minor differences’ as the minute yet highly significant symbolic
differences between individuals and groups to explore the antinomies of
sameness and difference within racial group recognition and representa-
tion. Drawing on the US context in general, and the native-born African
American/foreign-born black dichotomy in particular, I trace the trajec-
tories of different groups’ entry into the USA as a basis for the intra-racial
anxieties over economic competition for scarce economic resources and
opportunities. I then analyse the cultural claims and affective commitments
that validate this internal racial differentiation and offer some observations
on sameness as an irredeemable project. Finally, I consider a nuanced
approach to difference that avoids the unproductive polarities of an abso-
lutist vulgar ethnocentricism and an endlessly deferred and fragmented
sense of being that is aridly insubstantial, but question whether this can be
usefully appropriated in a racial sense.
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RACE AND THE ‘NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES’
The social scientific explanation of race is a protracted affair. Within
standard Marxian accounts, racial identification is an ideological effect of
material social and economic processes (cf. Solomos, 1986). In its Althusser-
ian sense, race is thus an ‘epistemological obstacle’ that promotes misplaced
analytical investments in illusory racial categories that obscure the real
social processes of racialized identities, relations, and practices. However,
this view is criticized for its un-reflexive scientism that trivializes the prac-
tical efficacy of race. Instead, it is argued that manifest realities such as
endemic social discrimination as well as the formation of racial communi-
ties forged in political struggle attest to the existence of race (Winant, 2004).
In addition, there are also attempts to navigate a precarious position
between these poles, accepting race as an ideological construct that is
experienced as real and demands attention precisely because of its material
effects (Bonilla-Silva, 2003).
These accounts focussing on what race is as a reified or concrete object
are (often tacitly) reliant on the work race performs as an affective order.
This is to say that the extent to which race is or is not felt in an ontological
sense is of immense importance. The intangible affective quality of race that
is constituted as an emotive and intuitive sensibility resists dispassionate
apprehension and becomes axiomatic: racial identity exists because it is
subjectively felt as such and not simply because it exists empirically or as a
social effect. To flesh this out conceptually, it is often argued that as race
(and ethnicity) do not exist within nature but are constituted socially and
culturally, they are situational, relational and comparative constructs
instead of primordial (cf. Patterson, 1975). It is, however, notable that all of
these adjectives denote or imply differentiation: race is a context-specific,
relative and contrasting form. Leaving aside the visibly ‘obvious’ pheno-
typical signs of race for its representative historical, social, and cultural
characteristics as outlined in the above example of African American
identity, we confront a simple question: By which processes are the subjec-
tive criteria for the historical, social, and cultural artifice of race established?
An initial response to this question would identify processes of negation.
Racial identification thus rearticulates hegemonic representations of inferi-
ority: for example, the transformation of ascribed physical, intellectual, and
moral deficiencies into venerable traits of beauty, intelligence, and civility.
But establishing what one is not remains, to a certain extent, within the prior
ontological universe of what one (falsely) was. It is, at best, a pragmatic
consciousness of being-for-itself that is subject to structuring by external
circumstance (cf. Sartre, 1989). This invites an affirmative project of inter-
nally establishing what one actually is as a metaphysical fact in the sense of
being-in-itself that is autonomous and sincere. Now we know from Sartre
(1989) that the establishment of such a coherent, essential subject is
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difficult enough given the vicissitudes of consciousness and self-activity as
well as a voluminous literature on the proliferation of options and
constraints that produce social actors’ identities. This complexity of recover-
ing a complete selfhood, difficult enough at the individual level, is magni-
fied during attempts to translate such local coherence onto that of a broader
group. But with regard to racialization, it is precisely this process of inven-
tion and the situational, relational, and comparative dimensions of the
affective order that produces race that is of interest. For example, the
German romanticist literary movement including Goethe, Herder and
Schiller that developed Germanic Kultur as an essence of national charac-
ter that might also be understood as ethnic, can also be understood as a
situational and comparative enterprise in relation to the status of Franco-
phone and Anglophone bourgeois culture and court nobility (Elias, 1994:
3–28). As a paradigmatic case, this suggests that affirmative notions of
essential cultural identity aspiring to establish a normative sense of being-
in-itself are always situational, relational, and comparative. But instead of
simply accepting the situational, relational, and comparative in a normative
descriptive sense we are left to question the evaluations and judgments,
implicit and explicit, within such distinctions that produce malignant effects
from ostensibly benign accounts of difference (Wallerstein, 1990). Consid-
ering the iniquitous history of race, such an inquiry is of utmost importance.
The over-determination of group identity and action popularized within
notions of racial community and collective behaviour has been usefully
critiqued as reducing ‘complex social and political processes’ to an
‘abstracted communitarian identity’ and then mapped onto the ‘theoretical
phenomenology of an encounter between abstract subjects’ (Bhatt, 2004:
18). Beneath this putatively social endeavour, Chetan Bhatt recognizes an
important subjective constitutive aspect of group identification that reflects
the very ‘western’ narcissism that is often criticized. Indeed, given that the
perceived economic in-group/out-group competition between the ‘native’
and ‘foreign-born’ black US population discussed above is supplemented
by ideas of cultural insiders and outsiders, the sameness that cements
belonging is a symbolic unity that contains an important affective dimen-
sion. Freud’s notion of ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ provides a
useful framework for understanding the qualitative aspects of this tension
between racial sameness and ethnonational difference. First presented as
‘precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form
the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them’ (1917: 199),
Freud later expanded this observation from the individual case to groups,
stating that ‘in the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feel
towards strangers with whom they have to do we may recognize the
expression of self-love – of narcissism’ (1921: 102). Later still, in ‘Civiliz-
ation and its Discontents’ Freud, somewhat problematically, refers to the
narcissism of minor differences as a ‘convenient and relatively harmless
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satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion
between the members of the community is made easier’ (1929: 114). Freud’s
inability to concretely understand why groups should be so acutely
receptive to such ‘details of differentiation’ becomes problematic in the
temptation to explain it as an ‘elementary character’ which is magnified by
his summation of its benign form that disregards its pernicious effects
(Ignatieff, 1997).
From the standpoint of human species unity, it is precisely the symbolic
economy of minor phenotypical differences that nourished the classical
biological notion of race. The recognition of superficial racial appearances
as indicative of significant internal human species differentiation illustrates
the limitations of an explanatory framework of human nature that elides
the constitutive basis of race and its pernicious assumptions and effects.
Nevertheless, Freud’s recognition of the narcissism of minor differences as
enabling group cohesion remains instructive for the argument here. His
tentative categorization of this process of group formation and mainten-
ance as an elementary human trait aside, it is possible to understand the
narcissism of minor differences through more standard sociological forms
of explanation as a social conflict between status groups who, in the example
of native- and foreign-born black Americans presented above, happen to
share a broad racial identification. Given the palatable contemporary
‘heterophilic’ forms of racism that depend on immutable and incommensu-
rate notions of cultural difference that naturalize racial ontology (Taguieff,
2001), it is all the more important to consider the subjective processes and
affective commitments through which racial identification is made and
validated. Even when identified, these processes can be remarkably resis-
tant to formal analytical critique; for example, the compelling totality of
communal movements characterized by, amongst other factors, a set of
cultural values that individuals identify intensely with, a communal meta-
physics, and the reification of communal values and mythic history that help
produce a key affective bond of an ‘emotional community’ (Wieviorka,
1995). Therefore, for an analysis of narcissism and differentiation, it is
important to address various motivations such as fear, failure, defensive-
ness, protection and affirmation as well as material and symbolic processes.
SOCIAL STATUS AND THE ETHNIC PARADOX OF RACIAL
SAMENESS
Contested claims to African American identification are immediately note-
worthy because they disturb the normative sense of distinctions between
groups as forming the fundamental basis of racial particularity and group
membership. On this impressionistic basis, intra-group differentiation is a
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negligible factor evident along arbitrary lines such as personal tastes and
inclinations. However, given the controversy over the ‘right’ to African
American, the (often underplayed) internal dissimilarities such as class,
ethnicity and nationality within racialized groups places the accepted notion
of difference between races taken as proof of coherent racial categories – as
well as the implicit internal group sameness – under a great deal of analyti-
cal and practical stress. It is, therefore, worth asking a simple question: What
happens to the cogency of racial group identity when the presupposition of
its constitutive internal similarity and external differentiation breaks down?
This question can be usefully engaged through a consideration of some
contemporary debates on the constitution of blackness in the USA. If the
development of ‘African American’ can be understood as a movement ‘into
line with other “hyphenated Americans”’ (Banton, 1997: 20), the formative
role of the term as denoting shared culturally distinctive group character-
istics through a notion of a collective experience of racial subjugation at the
hands of others analogous to the process of ethnogenesis recognized
amongst, for example, Palestinians (Banton, 1997: 38, 80) raises the issue of
authenticity and belonging. The salience of ‘African American’ has thus
stimulated a debate – long implicit within migrant experiences of black
African and Caribbean immigrants to the USA – on the character and
content of ‘black’ within contemporary social and political discourse. While
customary reference to ‘black’ as a global concept (in analytical and prac-
tical terms) presents it as a transnational phenomenon, the routes and
networks of black diasporic movement towards the USA reflected in both
established and recent migrants issue alternate understandings. It has been
argued that the South–North migratory patterns accelerated during the
early 20th-century have established a black diaspora within the USA (Neal,
1999) and the Great Migration to northern urban-industrial centres due to
various push and pull factors are thus indicative of a particular (American)
black experience that distinguishes them from those members of the
international diaspora moving directly into those same urban enclaves.
However, this basic descriptive difference of a black diaspora within the
USA is not simply a formal distinction between internal/national and
external/transnational migratory circuits, it is also strategically mobilized to
assert an important qualitative division between the ‘native’ and ‘foreign-
born’ black US population.
In a much-cited article, Toni Morrison (1993) addresses the popular
notion that, when the choice presents itself, African and black Caribbean
immigrants tend to identify ethnically as opposed to racially because they
quickly realize that blackness is firmly positioned at the bottom of the social
hierarchy within the USA. Morrison argues further that immigrants adopt
a ‘hostile position toward resident blacks’ in order to open the ‘American-
izing door’, which has the effect of firmly situating African Americans as the
‘real aliens’ and ‘nemesis’ of America despite the ‘ethnicity or nationality
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of the immigrant’ (1993: 57). While the affective basis of Morrison’s robust
critique is perhaps understandable it remains problematic. On one hand,
the ‘rejection’ affected by some black immigrants might be more in relation
to a perception of liberal and permissive American values and resisting
American cultural assimilation than simply a reaction against African
Americans; on the other hand, some narratives of black immigrants’ separ-
ation – such as a West Indian entrepreneurialism – are myths that are
unsupported by available research on levels of self-employment across the
native- and foreign-born black American population (Reimers, 2005). In
addition, it erroneously blames new immigrants ‘of colour’ for ‘playing the
ethnic card’ instead of directing critical energy more profitably toward
condemning the constricting choice between ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘exit’
presented to immigrants as well as developing an understanding of the
process of racialization as irreducible to ‘Americanization’ (Pessar, 2003:
26–7). And although it is an obvious enough point, immigrants and the
second generation do not experience their racialization within the USA as
a nationally bounded enterprise, but approach it relationally as mediated
through ‘cultural constructs and racial practices found in their countries of
origin’ (Pessar, 2003: 27). As such, the inescapable symbolic and practical
centrality of race in US social life is not necessarily the case for Caribbean
immigrants who, in many cases, begin to understand themselves as black or
perceive a marked emphasis on their blackness only on entry into the USA.
This suggests that the social formation and meanings of blackness within
the USA are subject to significant internal differentiation. While noting an
‘intimacy derived from the commonalities of black histories’ shared by
blacks within the USA, Carolle Charles recognizes a tension where some
Haitian immigrants encounter a not altogether unproblematic process of
becoming ‘black twice’ (2003: 172). ‘Being black twice’ entails asserting a
black subjectivity that is at once reflective of its past and responsive to its
American present, however, Charles suggests that sustaining a trans-
national blackness within the US national context is difficult if not imposs-
ible: one cannot be American and Haitian but must choose, with the
hegemonic position of the former often prevailing for the ‘native-born’
second generation. This is reminiscent of the unsatisfactory framework on
migration outcomes as either permanent settlement or permanent return
based on an ideology of allegiance to one nation state that implies unitary
national belonging and is unable to account for the normalcy of dynamic
transnational mobility and relations within the Caribbean example (Pessar,
2003: 23). However, in terms of the salience of ‘black’, what is most inter-
esting here is that the struggle over ‘African American’ is as much, if not
more, about access to social resources, the status and rights of (‘native’)
citizenship, and a claim to the historical development of the nation than it
is about blackness per se and the basis of racial belonging. And it is this very
distinction that illustrates how the salience of ‘black’ as a coherent form of
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racial sameness is crosscut, and in certain circumstances undermined, by
forms of ethnonational differentiation such as African American. The
dominant presentation of racial difference and its concomitant social
antagonisms as referring to external dissimilarities between groups is, there-
fore, contested by this process of internal differentiation. Of course, the
differences between African American and black are neither racial nor
racialized somatically, nonetheless it begs the question of the production
and management as well as the effects of difference per se within racialized
groups.
Nonetheless, the significance of foreign-born migratory trends to the
USA must not be overstated. If, as according to the New York Times (2004)
article, the number of blacks with ‘recent’ sub-Saharan African ‘roots’
almost tripled and the number of blacks of Caribbean origin grew by over
60 percent, it must be remembered that the numbers themselves remain
relatively small. A data sampling from the 2000 US Census (Malone et al.,
2003) estimates the total foreign-born population at 31.1 million, which
accounts for 11.1 percent of the total US population (counted at 281.4
million) and that 6.1 percent of this foreign-born population reported as
‘Black or African-American alone’.6 The foreign-born black population,
therefore, accounts for roughly 1.9 million or 5.2 percent of the 36.4 million
of the US population that identified as ‘black,African-American or Negro’.7
Whether this 5.2 percent constitutes a large and significant proportion of
the black/African American population depends on a series of perceptions,
including the level of economic threat they pose that is amplified by various
factors including the tendency of immigrant populations to cluster in highly
populous urban areas (US Bureau of the Census, 1999: 23–195).
Available evidence demonstrates the basis of this economic anxiety
although, as raw data, it cannot offer an explanation for it. Figures for 2003
suggest that foreign-born workers in general have higher levels of labour
force participation (74.5%) than the native-born population (63.2%) –
however, the former are more highly concentrated within service occupa-
tions (23%) and production, transportation and material moving
occupations (18%) than their native-born counterparts (15% and 12 %
respectively) (US Department of Labor, 2004). In earnings data also
collected by race and ethnicity, the median usual weekly earning of foreign-
born workers is 76 percent that of the native-born, while for foreign-born
blacks it is 99.8 percent of the median for native-born blacks – the corre-
sponding figure for white foreign-born workers is 99.7 percent and 94
percent for Asian foreign-born workers; the figure for foreign-born
Hispanic and Latina/o ethnicities is 76.1 percent. However, when calculated
per household in the 2000 census, median earnings for African Americans,
Afro-Caribbeans, and Africans are $33,790, $43,650, and $42,900 respec-
tively. Taken in combination with respective figures of 11.2 percent, 8.7
percent, and 7.3 percent for unemployment and 30.4 percent, 18.8 percent,
ST LOUIS ● THE DIFFERENCE SAMENESS MAKES
and 22.1 percent for below poverty, the significance of these data is easily
read: indeed, as one influential report put it, ‘The [black] newcomers have
numerous advantages compared to African Americans. Their own
education levels and incomes tend to be higher. They not only typically live
in somewhat different neighbourhoods, but in most metro areas these
neighbourhoods have a higher socioeconomic standing’ (Logan and Deane,
2003, emphasis added). However, the limits of sampling means that its
figures can often only be taken as suggestive and even the statistical
analyses of massive datasets such as a national census can only establish
correlations between populations and outcomes without explanatory
hypotheses. The ambiguity of the foreign-born black ‘advantage’ identified
by Logan and Deane is a case in point: the foreign-born may be objectively
and socially advantaged by various factors including education and
domicile or these characteristics might give them an advantage over African
Americans and have been achieved at the expense of African Americans.
Despite the inability of datasets to provide an adequate causal account of
foreign-born blacks’ socioeconomic mobility in zero-sum relation to that of
the native-born, in certain circumstances correlation can serve as evidence
enough to justify anxieties over the ‘threat’ outsiders pose.
As we well know, such unsubstantiated social anxieties are characterized
by the inflation of discrete incidents or absence of the very empirical objects
that generate their concerns. In this sense, the significant role of economic
restructuring in exacerbating the economic basis of racial stratification
within US society provides the tangible structural context for such anxieties.
The recent ‘twist’ in labour demand for the ‘soft’ skills essential to the infor-
mation industries producing a preference for highly educated and skilled
workers is accompanied by the manufacturing sector decline that has had
serious implications for the low-skilled class of African American workers.
This is evident in the spectacular decline in manufacturing throughout
many major northern cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, New York City
and Detroit (Wilson, 1999: 46–8). Most ironically and importantly, the
‘native-born’/‘foreign-born’ schism represents a form of diversionary
‘moral panic’ over undeserving outsiders that elides accurate explanations
of racism. As an exemplary form of the latter, an assiduously detailed study
(Brown et al., 2003) dismantles the colour-blind myth of racism as a past
historical event that explains existing racial stratification as squarely attrib-
utable to individual failure and group culpability. Instead, they argue
convincingly that racial disparities in access to high-quality social amenities
such as education, employment, housing, and healthcare is the result of a
systemic and pervasive undermining of black socioeconomic progress.
Amongst other things, this provides a clear and compelling account of US
racial stratification and the social immobility of African Americans as
attributable to forces other than the activities of a small number of
foreign-born migrants. But while it is perhaps tempting to explain this
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misperception of the parasitical foreign-born as a classic divide-and-
conquer manoeuvre, one is left having to explain the strong voluntarism and
symbolic basis of the version of an African American self-image that
opposes the foreign-born population.
CULTURAL LEGITIMATION AND THE NARCISSISM OF
RACIAL RECOGNITION
While it is possible to approach this as a classic in-group/out-group com-
petition, it is worth noting that the playing field is not necessarily level. The
general proportion of the foreign-born population that are naturalized US
citizens have resided in the US for many decades: of the foreign-born popu-
lation that entered before the 1970s, 81.6 percent became naturalized US
citizens as opposed to 66.3 percent, 44.6 percent and 13.4 percent of those
entering subsequently during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively
(Malone et al., 2003). This means that the full status and rights of citizen-
ship are not extensively held by recent foreign-born arrivals. With this in
mind, the perception of foreign-born black immigration that serves as the
basis of black intra-racial anxiety is perhaps compounded by low levels of
citizenship amongst the recently arrived foreign-born population that
presents their economic and social gains as somewhat illegitimate or
unearned – achieved, as Toni Morrison puts it, ‘on the back of blacks’.
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1985) argument that the hierarchical
distribution of ethnic groups within the US ‘social space’ is linked to ‘senior-
ity in immigration’, John R. Hall (1992: 269) argues that ‘previously
coherent ethnic groups’ are subject to internal stratification along class lines
such as the increasingly disparate socioeconomic positions of middle- and
working-class blacks. Hence, in reference to the symbolic bases of group
identity, Hall argues that ethnic groups can employ cultural capital in differ-
ent ways: a form of cultural capital enables a representative force in the
wider world while an alternate variety arranges internal group status. While
distinguishing between its ethnic and class forms, Hall argues that cultural
capital provides a useful metaphor ‘to understand struggles over status
group boundaries and prestige’ (1992: 273). Considering Kamus’s lament –
‘Am I not African American?’ – the question of who can stake a rightful
claim to African American is accompanied by the perhaps more important
analytical issue of what are the symbolic resources that produce the
African American ‘cultural distinctiveness’ necessary to support such an
assertion?
Discussing the use of a cultural rationale to assert immutable racial
essence in legal cases seeking to prohibit and protect forms of racial
distinction, Richard T. Ford conceptualizes a socially pervasive ‘difference
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discourse’ that maps an allocated social (racial) identity onto an indetermi-
nate but inherent (cultural) trait (2005: 28). Furthermore, ‘Difference
discourse describes social identities such as race as a manifestation of
underlying differences – a racial culture – while at the same time generating
those very differences’ (p. 28, emphasis added). Developing an interesting
analysis of the social production of group difference as analogous to
Foucault’s analysis of the ‘repressive hypothesis’, Ford argues that although
‘the politics of difference can be understood as a reaction to the hegemony
of integration and assimilation’, its political validity is questionable if it
‘threatens to become another hegemony, no less totalizing, no less
obsessive, no less myopic than the assimilationist ideal that preceded it’
(2005: 36).
For Ford, the emergence of increasingly covert forms of discrimination
has repressed certain styles of social interaction resulting in ‘a new bigotry
– not types of people but ways of being’ (2005: 37) that aims at transform-
ing ‘previously stigmatized groups’ in a manner more totalizing than
straightforward exclusion, which he sees as conversant with the project of
bio-power elaborated by Foucault. Therefore, the ‘repressive hypothesis’
relating to Victorian attitudes as feigning the repression of sexuality in an
attempt to mask an obsession with it that actually resulted in the produc-
tion of sexuality thus defining individual behaviour and modern attitudes
towards sex is mirrored within discourses on racial difference: thus, while
the contemporary manifestations of ‘difference discourse’ are framed as a
reaction to the repression of group difference, they are indicative of its very
production. The efficient proliferation of social difference and identities
along various lines such as racial, ethnic, and sexual, therefore, is not necess-
arily a realist reflection of difference that is objectively meaningful, but
signifies ‘the production of identity as a lifestyle, a way of being’ (2005: 39).
This produces a patina of solidarity that perniciously demands unthinking
affiliation which bypasses and does not require moderated discussion and
mediated resolution: it is already-existing because of the naturalizing effect
of the cultural essence that it emerges from organically. In turn, this
‘unearned solidarity’ validates an unsustainable belief in the form and
meaning of group membership that acts in a peculiarly didactic and coercive
manner and orders assessments of authentic group behaviour from within
the group. Epithets of inauthentic racial and ethnic subjectivities such as
‘Oreo’ and ‘coconut’ assert a specific normative ideal of group-appropriate
belief and behaviour that promotes conformity and possesses an incon-
testable justification of the censure of deviations from it. This then has the
important external effect of encouraging the inflation of group difference
and the importance and salience of its reified immutable historical and
cultural basis. The outcome of this, for Ford, is a grave situation where ‘a
right-to-cultural-difference will not simply leave people free from repres-
sion; instead, it will install a specific set of ideas about what it means to be
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a member of whichever group the right “protects”’ (2005: 41). Furthermore,
although such ‘rights’ can address deleterious social repression they danger-
ously reinforce common sense ideas about group specificity and difference
that themselves act as disciplinary and regulatory forms (p. 42).
This is not to suggest that, within the US context of blackness, ethno-
national difference trumps racial sameness. Indeed, it is precisely the
conflicted dialectic between difference and sameness within timeworn
processes of racialization turned internally onto group identification that
demonstrates the tenuous basis of narcissistic self-understandings of group
belonging and solidarity. While the relationship to Africa as a distant or
not-so-distant homeland can serve as an exclusionary principle within the
tightly policed boundaries of African American civil identity, it also
provides the basis for an inclusive dynamic of racial sameness. The project
of reconstituting such an expansive, transnational black identity is exempli-
fied within the service provided by African Ancestry Incorporated that
offers black Americans the opportunity to trace their African ancestry. For
the sum of $349, African Ancestry Inc. provides a home-testing kit for
collecting a DNA sample which is then compared with a bank of genetic
material including that gathered from 135 African groups. This ability to
establish genetic commonalities with African peoples is presented as
allowing black Americans an understanding of their ancestry in the import-
ant psychic sense of reconnecting them with their geographical, historical,
and cultural roots by ‘reconstructing’ the ‘bridge to the past [that] collapsed
with the advent of the slave trade’ (African Ancestry, n.d.).
This literal narcissism – in the descriptive sense of ‘self-love’ – is predi-
cated on impracticable conditions of racial unanimity. The narcissism of
minor differences central to cohering blackness is, therefore, necessarily
Janus-faced: in order to establish its immutable essence throughout the
Atlantic world and beyond, black must be a global concept – diachronic,
diasporic, and totalizing. However, in order to assert its local salience, black-
ness must also maintain a parochial façade of unity to protect this ‘native’
integrity against its ‘foreign’ interlopers. But given that the ‘native’ and
‘foreign’ are collapsed within the broader racial category as formally equiv-
alent, their crude separation within the narcissistic negotiation of difference
generates an unfortunate effect. Instead of countenancing internal differ-
entiation as acceptable forms of local deviation, it is abhorred as a corrosive
force which produces a zero-sum blackness that is at once divisively split
between global and local, self and other. These alternate black identities
thus become locked within a circular dialectic of ambivalence; they are
mutually reinforcing and antagonistic and, ironically, come to reflect the
concomitant polarities of contemporary racial intolerance and prejudice
that Pierre-Andre Taguieff (2001) recognizes as both ‘heterophobic’ and
‘heterophilic’. However, this dialectic is not an abstracted social morphol-
ogy but is played out within concrete situations marked by indices of power.
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The competing national and political positions from which this differentia-
tion is fought out is mediated through social authority and rhetorical
influence; therefore, the capacity to demarcate African American in an
exclusionary sense towards foreign-born migrants is a potent resource. And
it is precisely within this context that ‘difference discourse’ finds fertile
ground as a means to prohibit and protect particular forms of external and
internal racial differentiation.
Alongside the literal sense of narcissism as a vacuous and gratuitous
self-absorption that carries a pejorative association, this dialectic of racial
(self-)recognition can be considered in another way. Although by his own
standards the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ is extremely underdevel-
oped and must be considered more a notion than a concept, Freud’s broader
psychoanalytical framework provides a useful explanatory context. Simply
put, pathological or inchoate behaviours are not simply indicative of a wilful
obduracy that can be diagnosed as a moral and rational deficiency but are
rather symptomatic of unconscious psychic struggles. It is in this sense that
the narcissism of racial recognition might be approached differently as a
product of cultural trauma located within a collective (racial) identity.
Jeffrey Alexander (2004), for example, advances a ‘theory of cultural
trauma’ capable of building a reflexive sociological account of trauma as
socially constructed events that reveal ‘meaning struggles’ instead of
naturally existing phenomena. What is important in Alexander’s formu-
lation is his idea that events are not intrinsically traumatic but that trauma
is socially mediated and ascribed to phenomena that may or may not have
occurred. And, as sometimes highly imaginative, trauma construction is also
a process of representation that ‘seizes upon an inchoate experience from
life, and forms it, through association, condensation, and aesthetic creation,
into some specific shape’ (2004: 9). Alexander thus focuses on epistemo-
logical concerns – the process and conditions under which claims to trauma
are made – to initiate a sociological attempt to identify the conditions under
which normative accounts of trauma are established. As a result, cultural
trauma may be subject to the imaginative play of representation, under-
stood as having a distorting effect on reality, and demonstrative of a peculiar
rationality. This project is germane to the discussion at hand in this article
in the form of the question of whether the narcissism of minor differences
that produces the dialectic of internal racial sameness and difference might
be accurately considered as a result of a traumatic effect. By extension, this
implies that narcissistic racial (self-)recognition need not simply be a
conceited egotism devoid of mitigating circumstance and/or redemptive
possibility.
In Ron Eyerman’s (2004) estimation there are significant reasons to
accept African American identity formation as subject to constitutive
traumatic effects. The catastrophic event of slavery issued traumatic effects
well into its aftermath evident within African Americans’ struggles for
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representation and recognition within America as equal citizens before the
state and human beings amongst others. Eyerman presents a compelling
account of slavery as informing a collective African American identity
through a collective consciousness transmitted within the public and private
spheres through a variety of media. However, noting the heterogeneity of
positions and interests within the black ‘community’, Eyerman also points
to the responsibility and burden of representation assumed by black public
figures such as artists and intellectuals. Crucial to an understanding of this
dynamism is the selective and mediated process of this remembrance and
representation which carries the power to speak and make visible that is
conducted from privileged vantage points. As such, African American
identification with a traumatic past is imaginatively reconstructed from an
objective reality that, when translated by ‘community’ leaders and intellec-
tuals, is ‘tinged with a bit of strategic, practical, and political interest’ (2004:
61). This returns us to a central dilemma engaged within this article: Does,
or indeed can, this struggle for recognition justify the deleterious impli-
cations regarding the exclusion of foreign-born black Americans from
identification and representation as African Americans? Stating that
‘succeeding generations of American blacks have rediscovered their slave
past and blackness with increasing intensity’ (p. 110), Eyerman suggests that
African American as a collective identity is moving forward toward
progressive possibilities instead of retreating to the radical separatism of
1960s’ nationalism. Citing a transformed approach to integration, Eyerman
discerns ‘the coexistence of a distinctive and relatively autonomous
[African American] collective history and the progressive political and
economic integration into an American society that is also altered in the
process’ (p. 111, emphasis added).
In its strict sense, the sociological theory of cultural trauma as presented
by Alexander that eschews ontological and moral questions – the interro-
gation of the accuracy and justifications of actors’ claims to trauma –
appears to indemnify this transformation of African American identity
from critique. However, Eyerman’s own evaluative conclusions of
‘progressive political and economic integration’ forfeit this facility. First of
all it is worth noting that Eyerman’s research agenda is introspectively
American and the situational, relational, and comparative dimensions of
the affective order of African American identification is resolutely domestic
vis-à-vis other established American racial populations. While this is entirely
legitimate in terms of presenting a historical sociology of trauma effects,
analytical problems arise when one considers the alteration of contempor-
ary American society through its contact with a progressive, assertive
African American collective identity. The location of the foreign-born after
history, so to speak, within an America that only progresses through
historical aftershocks emanating from within its own boundaries suggests
the cessation of meaningful immigration or migrants – a not entirely
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unfamiliar refrain in certain conservative circles seeking to limit present
and future immigration. Furthermore, this presupposition all but ignores
the transnational hybridity of black ethnicities which further reinforces the
USA’s hegemonic position as the site of paradigmatic blackness that is
amplified within the circuits of cultural globalization (Sansone, 2003).
Within such a rigidly local setting, the analytical and practical abuse of
trauma remembrance through misappropriation is unsurprising: in local
hands serving local ends, the cultural trauma ‘defence’ becomes an indis-
criminate instrument in the pursuit of retributive as opposed to redistribu-
tive justice that results in significant collateral damage that includes
foreign-born black Americans. Although this view informs the flawed and
specious conservative critique of affirmative action and quotas (Brown et
al., 2003), it is worth considering only because of the un-reflexive zero-sum
approach to rights that it also represents. From a progressive point of view,
if the native-born right to social opportunities and resources is necessarily
achieved at the denigration of foreign-born others, then the political defen-
sibility and moral worth of such rights demands (re)assessment.
LIVING WITH DIFFÉRANCE
Considering this divisive parochialism the only salient analytical approach
to claims to racial recognition is to uncover and assess their underlying
motivations and interests. This entails evaluating particular references to
difference and sameness as claims to representation and recognition instead
of accepting racial identity as predicated on immutable social facts, intrin-
sic historical and cultural identities, or necessary political strategies.
Histories, structures, and relations of racial stratification and racism have
produced the material and symbolic processes of exclusion and stigmatiza-
tion from which ‘difference discourse’ is an understandable, if regrettable,
outcome. And given the normative social status of race and its immutable
cultural essence, racialized social justice agendas can easily become
reducible to a racial politics. In this vein, introspection and auto-critique as
well as severe reservations over the salience of racial identity are charac-
terized as an apolitical disengagement with the ‘real world’ and practical
lives of ordinary people (Noguera, 2003). However, this putative reality of
social structures and relations, identities and actors presents difference and
sameness as objective facts, obscuring the naturalizing process within
difference discourse that is reinforced by the moral and rhetorical author-
ity gained from its ‘somber and weighty sanctimoniousness, which has
intimidated those who might puncture its pretensions and deterred
deserved critique’ (Ford, 2005: 211). If, as I have argued, difference and
sameness can be strategically constructed and mobilized in specific contexts
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to particular ends – such as the use of Africa to reinforce and undermine
black diasporic unanimity – then the specific political terms of their form
and function is of central concern. This is all the more prescient given Ford’s
political apprehensions about difference discourse: ‘The focus on difference
diverts attention from racism . . . and instead misleadingly suggests that
racial injustice is primarily the result of objective and intrinsic difference
among natural racial groups’ (2005: 31).
While the ontological ideal of racial sameness cannot be usefully reha-
bilitated, the significance of racialized difference presents a separate
quandary. As laudable as they are, contemporary academic research
agendas concerned with the critique of ontological authenticity often
assume ‘difference’ to be inherently iniquitous. Cautioning against this
entire rejection of difference as an efficacious concept by highlighting the
significance of power and resistance within the incessant (re)making of
identity, Stuart Hall (1990) notes that difference, metaphorical and real,
represents an actual sentient and material past. The terrors of colonialism
and Atlantic slavery, for example, are indisputable realities and their social
traces, filtered through processes of representation, have a differentiating
effect. This, in combination with their perception as meaningful and signifi-
cant, means that the representation of difference cannot be dismissed
lightly. This, then, intimates the need to develop a reflexive understanding
of difference that produces categories that are neither intrinsically real nor
typically insular in character. In this regard, Hall’s (1990: 229) approach to
cultural identity through Derrida’s concept of ‘différance’ as the production
of meaning through the interaction between difference and deferral is
instructive here. For Hall, cultural identity is never a pristine and stable
concrete reality but is produced and positioned through the representation
of difference that is continually transformed. Therefore, as its ‘positioning’
is of crucial importance, ‘difference’ per se is not inherently problematical,
but rather the analytical and political work that is often expected of it.
In relation to its positioning, Lorenzo Simpson eschews the unproduc-
tive customary opposition between difference as ‘invidiously ethnocentric’
as with homogeneous notions of ‘community’ or as ‘uninterestingly thin’ as
in the heterogeneity of ‘fragmented’ difference (2001: 10–11). Instead, he
advocates a ‘situated cosmopolitanism’ as a communicative discourse
framed by an ideal of ‘mutual understanding’. This project foregrounds the
dialogic possibility of the ‘reversibility of perspectives’ that, apropos
Gadamer, produces a ‘fusion of horizions’ which transforms instead of
extinguishes difference and enables ‘something new’ to be recognized. Such
a mutually respectful interaction attempts to forge a language that enables
‘noninvidious and mutually critical cross-cultural representation’ (2001: 81)
that would, ideally, offer a transformative and edifying pedagogical
encounter for all parties. As the resultant representations of difference
within this dialogue are reflexively constituted and characteristically
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provisional, the telos of Simpson’s project is ‘not agreement . . . but mutual
understanding’ (p. 88), and signals the instantiation of a ‘moment of
common humanity’ specifically oriented towards the ‘noninvidious repre-
sentation’ of difference. But as a consequence, this problematizes the
efficacy of racialized difference: given its primary – if not sole – cultural
basis, difference ‘does not require a racial substrate or a racialized line of
transmission’ (p. 135). Indeed, the representation of fluid différance, as
(re)produced in and through culture, need – and ought – not be collapsed
into historical connections with a given race.
Ultimately, such a provisional sense of difference or différance brings the
very efficacy of strong racial identification as fact instead of process into
question, especially when the antithesis of sameness that sustains it is shown
to be an indefensible and pernicious construct. This reflects the dilemma
posed within Chetan Bhatt’s understanding of the insoluble bond between
racial sameness and difference presented in the above epigraph. And, in a
prescriptive vein, it invokes the prospective ‘imperialism of identity’
advocated by K. Anthony Appiah (1996). Appiah expresses a notable
concern with the incapacity of racial identity to express anything other than
prosaic dissimilarity (say skin colour) that is intrinsically insignificant, or
reified ontology (say attitudinal and behavioural homogeneity) that is
dangerous in the compelling reality it is taken to reflect and not invent. This
invites the ‘imperialism of identity’ and presents hard choices regarding the
salience of racial (self-)identification, which cannot escape the relations of
power within which self-representation and social recognition are framed:
As all native-born African Americans clearly do not harbour animosity
towards the foreign-born population, is this cleavage newsworthy because
journalists have suddenly become critical theorists of race, or does it present
an opportunity to use race as proof of natural racial hierarchies and the
amelioration of racism?
If the native-/foreign-born dispute over African American identification
has its material basis in perceptions of socioeconomic competition, its
symbolic foundations and justification reflect the disingenuous processes of
racialization in its classical form. Within the racial paradigm, ostensibly
benign descriptions of difference and sameness are never that but placed in
hierarchical order through their relationship to each other. And, as an
irregular example of internal racial differentiation that ought to puncture
the salience of race, the effect of the native-/foreign-born dichotomy is often
the opposite. Thus, the foreign-born are not racial and demonstrate a culture
of industry and discipline, while the native-born are taken to represent a
‘culture of poverty’ that is innate to their character and are therefore racial.
And when the foreign-born are resituated as racial in relation to their
putative successes and socioeconomic mobility, they prove that the engage-
ment of racism is unnecessary: racism can therefore be dismissed as an
unfortunate event now happily consigned to the past and the travails of the
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native-born are explicable as individual failings and collective torpor.
Beneath all of this lies a valuable lesson: that the conceptual and practical
‘death’ of race and ascent of ethnicity announced an aeon ago (UNESCO,
1952) and frequently restated has failed to become doxa should tell us
something: an awareness of the analytical exhaustion of race has not
weakened the energy of the affective investments it enthuses. Therefore,
from whatever vantage point we occupy to promote and witness the spec-
tacle of race either limping along in chronic ill-health to its final death or
retaining vital life signs, our attempts to understand the symbolic and
material meanings of racialized identification might usefully pause for
reflection on the substantive, ethical, and political basis of that identity as
well as the activity of making and inhabiting it.
Notes
1 Obama emphatically disputes this as a nationally narrow and limiting idea of
blackness: ‘I can’t even hold up my experience as being somehow representative
of the black American experience . . . [but] I can embrace my black brothers and
sisters, whether in this country or in Africa, and affirm a common destiny without
pretending to speak to, or for, all our various struggles’ (2004: xvi).
2 See Henry Louis Gates’s speech, ‘America Behind the Color Line’ (Gates, 2004).
3 The dialectic between difference and sameness discussed in this article is played
out across race and ethnicity. Because the two are supposed to be constitutively
and functionally different, I have decided to consider them separately and in
articulation in relation to a narcissistic appropriation of sameness and difference
instead of opting for an ostensibly more accurate ethnoracial category. My
concern is less with the ‘accuracy’ of the conceptual category, but its practical and
affective formation, the analytical work it performs, and the social distinctions it
helps draw.
4 It must be noted that the campaign to adopt ‘African American’ in the late 1980s
especially was far from universally supported amongst black Americans.
Therefore, the arguments raised in this article pertain towards a specific version
of African American self-identification that is ambivalent towards Africa and
apprehensive towards the ‘foreign-born’ black US population and is not a
judgment of reference to African American in a general sense.
5 I refer to this as a myth not in the sense of a pervasive falsification, but in terms
of the privileging of one determining line of descent consonant with the one-drop
rule instead of enumerating the genealogical complexity characterized by
differing ‘racial’ heritage. Of course, this error is not that of African Americans
per se but is the effect of a classical racialism based upon a strong notion of race
as distinctive hereditary types.
6 However, 23.5 percent of the ‘foreign-born’ population reported ‘two or more
races’ of which a percentage can be assumed to include black or African-
American.
7 It is worth noting that 1.7 million or 4.8 percent of those reporting as ‘black,
African American or Negro’ did so ‘in combination’ with another race.
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